The build-operate-transfer (BOT) method of developing public infrastructure has been used for many projects in Asia. Unfortunately, about 30% of the BOT projects have had disappointing results. In undertaking such projects, the private sector incurs significant risks that must be understood and managed for such projects to be successful. This paper reports the results of a study of seven Asian BOT projects undertaken to determine the primary risks the project sponsor faced, the risk management strategies that were selected, and the results obtained. Two major categories of risk were identified, general risks and project-specific risks. From this analysis, a risk management framework was developed for each category of risk. The results of this study indicate that the private sector cannot be the only participant in risk management, but that the host government's active support is essential to have a viable BOT project in Asia.
INTRODUCTION
To meet the growing demand for public services, many Asian countries have adopted private-public partnerships for the development of public infrastructure. A popular approach is to use a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project delivery method for the needed infrastructure. Under the BOT approach, the project sponsor is responsible for financing, designing, and constructing the project and operating it for a certain concession period. During the concession period, the project sponsor collects revenues from operating the project to repay the project costs as well as to provide a profit. At the end of the concession period, ownership of the completed project is transferred to the host government.
Project participants include the granting authority, which typically is a government agency; the project sponsor; and one or more financial institutions. The granting authority identifies project requirements, establishes the concession period, solicits tenders, and awards the contract. The project sponsor typically is a consortium or joint venture of engineering, construction, and venture capital firms, and may include equity investors such as the host government or institutional investors. Investment capital may come from commercial banks, insurance companies, or the sale of bonds. The relationships among the project participants are shown in Figure 1 . The constructor typically invests equity during the early phases on the project, but often sells its position upon the completion of construction. At the end of the concession period, all operating rights and operational responsibilities revert to the granting authority.
Figure 1. Relationships Among BOT Project Participants

ASIAN PRIVATIZED INFRASTRUCTURE MARKET
Since the late 1980s, many Asian countries have developed privatized infrastructure projects as a way to meet the needs of a growing population (Pollalis and Menhere 1996) . Over 70% of Asian BOT projects have been developed by international sponsors (Kwak 2002) . Most of these projects have been for power generation or transportation. Over the last decade, about 30% of the BOT infrastructure projects in Asia had disappointing performance due to delays and avoidable cost overruns, which led to the suspension of the projects (Kwak 2002) . Understanding the causes of these project problems and the risks faced in Asian BOT project will be useful to crafting strategies for avoiding similar results on future BOT projects.
PROJECT RISKS
Risk management starts with identification of the various categories of risk that could be encountered. As compared with other project delivery methods, risk management in BOT projects is more complicated because of the wider scope of work, the length of the concession period, and the scope of contractual responsibilities undertaken by the project sponsor. In general, the primary risks associated with a BOT project can be broadly grouped into two major categories, general risks and project-specific risks (UNIDO 1996) .
GENERAL RISKS
General risks are defined as those risks related to the macro-environmental factors of the host country such as the political environment, economic condition, the legal system, taxation, or fluctuations in currency exchange rate. Each country presents a different set of these risks associated with these factors. These risks may severely affect the concession agreement and the project's cash flow during the lifetime of a BOT project. Therefore, it is extremely important to identify these risks before undertaking a project, particularly in a developing country. These general risks can be subdivided into political risks, financial risks, and legal risks.
Political risks are associated with the host country's political environment. These risks can be divided into two categories, sovereign risks and instability risks. Sovereign risks include expropriation of assets by the government, restriction of operating freedom, increased taxes or other financial penalties, constraints on the ability to repatriate profits, and other government interference that could jeopardize the project (Lang 1998) . Instability risks relate to cancellation or revision of contracts and damage to property or injury to personnel from terrorism or riot. In developing countries, it is extremely important to mitigate against political risks, since major political changes often occur (Tam 1999) .
Financial risks relate to the host country's economic environment such as currency devaluation, foreign exchange fluctuation, fluctuation in interest rates, and inflation. These risks are especially significant for a BOT project in Asia, since revenues, expenses, capital expenditures, and loans typically are in more than one currency. These risks affect the cost of debt service and the real value of the project revenue.
Legal risks relate to the host country's changes in the legal system during the concession period. The success of a BOT project is dependent on contractual agreements and financing arrangements undertaken to support the project. Thus any host country legislation modifying tax codes, environmental regulations, labor regulations, import restrictions, and corporate regulations may undermine the long-term viability of a BOT project.
PROJECT-SPECIFIC RISKS
Unlike the general risks, project-specific risks can be controlled by the project participants. These risks can be best identified and analyzed when classified by the different project stages, which are development, construction, and operation.
Development stage risks refer to the many uncertainties that may arise at the beginning of the project. These risks include defects in the request for proposal; planning and approval delays; errors in economic, environmental, or technological assessment; and rejection of the proposal by the granting authority. The most important of these risks is losing the tender to another proposing sponsor (Tiong 1996) . Construction stage risks primarily relate to delays in completion and cost overruns. Construction delays may be caused by technical difficulties, by poor management, or by a combination of both. Since BOT investors rely on income from the completed project to recover their investment, any delay in completion will delay the generation of revenue. Cost overruns will impact the profitability of the project by increasing construction and financing costs.
Operation stage risks relate to increased cost of operation and insufficient revenue from the completed project. Actual operation and maintenance costs may exceed those anticipated during project planning. The revenue risk has two components, demand risk and price risk. The demand risk is the uncertainty regarding the demand for the product or service provided by the completed project. The price risk is the price that realistically can be charged for the product or service. The price may be set by the granting authority or by competing projects.
METHODOLOGY
To develop risk management strategies for BOT projects in Asia, a study of seven Asian projects was undertaken (Lee 2003) . Each project was analyzed to determine the primary risks the project sponsors faced, the risk management strategies that were selected, and the results obtained. Projects were selected using the following criteria:
The projects should be located in diverse regions within Asia.
A variety of project types should be represented.
CASE STUDY ANALYSES SHAJIAO B POWER STATION, CHINA
Shajiao B Power Station is a 700 MW coal-fired plant located in Guangdong, China. The project sponsor is a joint venture of Shenzen Special Economic Zone Power Co. (SPDC) and Hopewell Power (China) Ltd. (HPC) (Walker and Smith 1995) . HPC was responsible for financing all construction costs and developing the power station, while SPDC was responsible for providing the land, operating the facility, and purchasing the electricity generated. The concession period was 20 years. Revenues were structured in both local and foreign currency. Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company provided guarantees on the power purchase agreement and coal supply agreement (Lang 1998 ). An analysis of the risks and mitigation methods for the Shajio Power Station is shown in Table  1 .
DABHOL POWER PLANT, INDIA
The Dabhol power station is a 2,015 MW gas-fired plant located about 300 km south of Mumbai, India. The project sponsor is Dabhol Power Company, which is a joint venture of Enron Development Corp., Bechtel Enterprises, and General Electric Capital (Pollalis and Menheere 1996) . The concession period was 20 years. At the end of the concession period, the plant would be transferred to the Maharashtra State government. Just as project financing was secured, the state government was voted out of office. The new state government terminated the BOT contract and negotiated a new one in which the state government took a 30% equity position in the Dabhol Power Company. As a concession to Enron, the new agreement stipulated that the power output would be priced in U.S. dollars. To control fuel costs, the power company entered into 20-year contracts for natural gas from Qatar. An analysis of the risks and mitigation methods for the Dabhol Power Plant is shown in Table 2 . 
PAGBILAO POWER PLANT, THE PHILIPPINES
The Pagbilao Power Plant is a 735 MW coal-fired plant located on Pagbilao Grande Island. The project sponsor is Hopewell Power Philippines Corp., and the concession period is 25 years (Lysy) . Under the terms of the project agreement, the Philippines National Power Corp. was required to provide the sponsor with the project site, construct transmission facilities connecting the plant to the electrical grid, supply fuel, and purchase the power generated by the plant. The sponsor was required to build and operate the plant and construct access to the project site including a bridge linking Pagbilao Grande Island to Luzon. The Philippine Government took responsibility for any changes in Philippine laws or regulations. An analysis of the risks and mitigation methods for the Pagbilao Power Plant is shown in Table 3 . 
LAIBIN B POWER PLANT, CHINA
The Laibin B Power Plant is a 700 MW coal-fired plant located in Guangxi Province (EDF 1998) . It was the first infrastructure project in China to be financed entirely by foreign investors and developed by a foreign company. The project sponsor is a joint venture between Electricite de France International and GEC Alsthom, and the concession period is for 18 years. An analysis of the risks and mitigation methods for the Laibin B Power Plant is shown in Table 4 .
NORTH-SOUTH HIGHWAY, MALAYSIA
The North-South Highway runs approximately 900 km from the Thai border to Singapore. The project sponsor is Projek Lebruhraya Utara-Selatan Berhad, which is a multinational consortium. The government assumed primary responsibility for traffic and revenues, currency fluctuation, and political actions; and provided substantial loans and financial guarantees (Fisher and Babbar 1996) . The estimated project cost of U.S.1.3 billion escalated to U.S.$3.2 billion due to construction difficulties and exchange rate fluctuation (Walker and Smith 1995) . All toll adjustment requires Malaysian government approval, but if project revenues fall short during the first 17 years of operation, the government will provide standy
financing. An analysis of the risks and mitigation methods for the North-South Highway is shown in Table 5 . 
HIGH SPEED RAIL PROJECT, TAIWAN
The High Speed Rail Project runs approximately 350 km from Taipei to Kaohsiung, which is almost the entire length of Taiwan (Bureau of Taiwan High Speed Rail). The project sponsor is Taiwan High Speed Rail Co., Ltd., which is a consortium of five prominent local business groups, and the concession period is 35 years. In addition to developing and operating the rail system, the project sponsor was given the right to undertake property development around the ten stations for a period of 50 years. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications assumed all responsibility for land acquisition and arranged a government loan at a fixed interest rate. The project is behind schedule due to delayed land acquisition, but the project sponsor was not compensated for the delay, because a schedule for delivery of the land was not specified in the contract. The devaluation of the Taiwanese currency in 1997 increased project costs by about U.S.$500 million. An analysis of the risk and mitigation methods for the High Speed Rail Project is shown in Table 6 . 
SECOND STAGE EXPRESSWAY, THAILAND
The 40.5 km Second Stage Expressway System connects metropolitan Bangkok with growing suburban areas (Tam 1999) . The project sponsor is the Bangkok Expressway Co. Ltd., which is a consortium of international and local companies, and the concession period was 30 years. The Thai government retained the responsibility for all land acquisition. Tolls are collected jointly with the First Stage Expressway System under a revenue sharing arrangement. A major restructuring occurred in 1994 when a major participant in the sponsoring consortium left the project due to disputes with the granting authority regarding user fees (Ongpipattanakul 1999) . The government delayed a toll increase, and the poor revenues caused insufficient cash flow problems, which resulted in another debt repayment rescheduling in 2000. No effective risk mitigation methods were identified for this project.
CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of these seven case studies indicates that allocation of project risks to the party best able to control those risks is essential for a successful BOT project. The level of general risk differs depending upon the project location and the level of government support. Analysis of the seven projects suggests the allocation of general project risks and appropriate mitigation methods shown in Table 7 . The most effective strategy in managing these risks is to obtain the host government's support and active involvement in the project. The nature of project-specific risks depends on the type of project and the contracting framework used in its execution. Analysis of the seven projects suggests the allocation of project-specific risks and appropriate mitigation methods shown in Table 8 . The project sponsor is in a better posture to manage these risks that it is to manage the general risks listed in Table 7 . The results of this study indicate that the private sector cannot be the only participant in risk management, but that the host government's active support is essential to have a viable BOT project in Asia.
